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Abstract 
This study estimates the change in productivity of Chinese state enterprises during 1983-1987 using a panel data 
set of 403 firms. A new approach to productivity measurement is used. Under this approach, the production 
functions can differ arbitrarily across firms, important given the heterogeneity of the sample. The resulting coef- 
ficients estimate the marginal products of each factor as well as overall productivity growth. The results suggest 
Chinese productivity increased by 4.6 % per year, with about half of this growth due to the rapidly improving 
education of the labor force. 
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1. Introduction 
Between 1983 and 1987, the People's Republic of China changed the administration of 
state-owned enterprises in a variety of ways in an attempt to increase their efficiency. During 
1983 and 1984, an explicit tax system was introduced, affecting most state-owned enterprises. 
While marginal tax rates were very high, given the combined effects of the income tax, the 
adjustment tax, and the return of depreciation allowances to the government, firms were 
still able to retain more of their profits than had been the case in the past, increasing their 
incentive to be efficient. While the government specified what fraction of after-tax profits 
should be used for new investment vs. worker bonuses and benefits, firms were still given 
much more discretion over their internal operations than they had in earlier years, allowing 
them to respond to these new incentives. By 1987, many firms signed contracts with the 
government specifying minimum tax payments and sometimes minimum investment rates. 
Detailed provisions in the contracts varied by firm. Under these contracts, marginal tax 
rates were often very low. During this period, there was a further relaxation of direct govern- 
ment controls over state-enterprise decision-making. The intent was to imitate the design of 
the responsibility system in agriculture that had been such a successJ In addition to these 
broad changes in policy, a number of experimental policies were instituted on a smaller scale. 
The basic objective of these policy changes was to raise the efficiency of state-owned 
enterprises. Different stages of the reforms aimed at different aspects of efficiency. First, 
allowing firms to retain a larger fraction of profits, and linking the pay of workers more 
closely to profits, should have increased work effort and reduced stockpiles of inputs. As a 
result, it was hoped that each firm would produce more, for any given allocation of inputs. 
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Second, forcing finns to sell directly to customers, and eliminating the right to sell unwanted 
goods to a government procurement agency, gave firms the incentive to change their prod- 
uct mix. Third, the allocation rules for factors changed substantially. Under the profit reten- 
tion rules, firms had to allocate some fraction of profits to new investment, implying more 
investment by the more profitable firms. 2 Bank loans replaced government grants as the 
main alternative source of finance, presumably leading to more attention to the firm's ability 
to repay any loan. These new allocation rules could well have changed the efficiency with 
which factors were allocated across firms, shifting inputs from firms where the value of 
their marginal product was low to firms where the value of their marginal product was 
high. There were no explicit labor, capital, or land markets in China during this period, 
however, restricting firms' ability to improve efficiency in this sense. 
The objective of this paper is to make use of survey data on 403 state-owned enterprises, 
to measure the changes in the productivity of these firms between 1983 and 1987, to assess 
the effectiveness of these reforms. In the process, we also estimate the value of the margi- 
nal products of each factor, and the degree to which they vary across finns. This allows 
us to measure the degree to which productivity growth during the period arose from a 
reallocation of factors toward more productive firms, as well as from each firm becoming 
more productive. 
The survey used was designed by members of the Institute of Economics in the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, in collaboration with American and European economists. 
The 403 firms included in the survey were located in many different regions of China, 
and include firms in many different industries and of many different sizes. The State Statis- 
tical Bureau administered the survey during September 1988. The data are roughly com- 
parable in scope to the Compustat data, though covering six years (1980 plus 1983-1987) 
rather than twenty years. In addition, there is a supplementary data set describing the links 
between each firm and the government? 
Existing techniques for estimating productivity growth and marginal products of factors 
proved to be inappropriate in this context. In particular, the sample included firms in thirty 
different two-digit industries, so that we could not plausibly assume a common parametric 
production, profit, or cost function for these firms. Given the limited nature of the economic 
reforms, we could not even assume that these firms act to maximize profits or minimize 
costs. We therefore developed a new approach to estimate productivity growth, in which 
the observed changes in outputs are compared with those for inputs during the sample period. 
Productivity growth is measured by the degree to which output growth is larger than can 
be explained by input growth. 
In Section 1, we describe the theoretical approach used to assess the degree to which 
the productivity of state-owned enterprises has changed under the reforms, and where and 
when these improvements have been largest. In Section 2, we discuss how the survey data 
were used to estimate the desired expressions measuring productivity change, while the 
resulting estimates are reported and described in Section 3. The final section provides a 
brief summary of our main results. 
2. Theoretical Approach to Estimating Productivity Change 
In any given year, the real output of a firm depends on the quantities of the various inputs it 
has available in production, and on the regulatory structure and incentives that it faces. If 
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we assume that changes in the regulatory structure and incentives affect output in a Harrod 
neutral fashion, then the real output, Qes, of enterprise e in year s measured in the prices 
of some base year t can be written as 
aes = Fe(gels . . . . .  KeNs)Ge(Xels, " ' ' ,  XeMs),  (1) 
where Kegs measures the real amount of the ith input available to the firm in year s, while 
Xejs measures the j th  characteristic of the regulatory environment affecting the firm in 
year s. 
The traditional approach used to estimate productivity change is to estimate equation (1) 
directly, assuming some parametric form for the function F, common for all firms, along 
with some parametric specification for the function G. 4 In many cases, authors simply assume 
that the function F is Cobb-Douglas, and that the function G captures exponential growth. 
But this assumption of a common production function is hardly plausible given that our 
sample includes such a diverse set of firms. Imposing this assumption when inappropriate 
would lead to a variety of mistaken inferences. For example, if firms have a common tech- 
nology then efficiency requires equal factor proportions for all firms. As a result, this 
assumption implies that any variation in factor proportions within the sample results from 
a misallocation of factors. While factor proportions certainly vary among the firms within 
our sample, it seems inappropriate to impose this inference on the results. In addition, 
under this assumption firms with extreme factor proportions would be forecast to be less 
profitable everything else equal, given that they have not minimized costs at the market 
prices for the factors. If these firms with extreme factor proportions do not in fact have 
sufficiently lower profits, then under the assumption of a common technology we would 
infer that they are more efficient. Again, it seems inappropriate to impose such a conclu- 
sion a priori. 
Recent advances in methodology in productivity research, in particular, the stochastic 
frontier production approach [Schrnidt and Lovell (1979), Forsund et al. (1980), Bauer 
(1990) and many others] and the distance function approach [Fare et al. (1992)], also re- 
quire production technology to be identical up to one or two intercept terms across firms. 
Therefore, they also are not applicable to such a diverse sample of firms. There are also 
strands of literature that measure improvement in productivity and allocative efficiency by 
estimating a frontier profit function [Lovell and Sickles (1983), Sickles et al. (1986)] or a 
frontier cost function [Atkinson and Halverson (1984), Kumbhakar (1993) and Atkinson 
and Cornwell (1994)]. But it would be presumptuous to assume a priori that Chinese firms 
in this period act to maximize profits or minimize costs--in fact most inputs in China were 
allocated by higher authorities rather than chosen by firms. In any case, given the lack 
of labor or capital markets, there were no market-clearing prices for these factors, prices 
which are needed in the estimation of profit or cost functions. 
In order to allow the shape of production functions to differ arbitrarily across firms, 
we make no attempt to compare the level of productivity of different firms in this study. 
Instead, we focus on changes in productivity over time within each firm by comparing 
changes in a firm's output over time with changes in its inputs. To the extent to which out- 
put growth is larger than can be explained by input growth, we infer that productivity has 
increased? In the process, we can estimate the pattern of variation of the marginal product 
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of each factor across firms. If a factor is indeed allocated efficiently across firms, then its 
marginal products will be the same in all firms regardless of differences in the underlying 
technology across firms. Within the model, deviations from efficient factor allocations are 
allowed to occur in response to both observable and unobservable factors. 
In particular, we take an exact finite difference of (1) between year t and year s, making 
the change in the real value of output of enterprise e between year s and year t a linear 
function of the changes in each of the Kei s and Xej s. Doing so, we find that 
A t s Q  e = Get ~ ~ e A t s g e i  + Fes ~ ~ ; A t s X e j  ' 
i j 
(2) 
where Axt, Y i = Y/t - Y/s for any variable Y/, G et = Ge(Xel t ,  . . . ,  XeNt) , 
G e t F  e = G et F e ( g e l s ,  . . . ,  ge i  t, . . . ,  gears) - F e ( g e l s ,  . . . ,  ge i  s, . . . ,  geNs) 
A tsge i  
is a first-order approximation to the marginal productivity of factor i in year t, F es = 
Fe(Xels, . . . ,  X e N s )  , and 
F e S G f  = F es a e ( X e l s  . . . .  , Xejt, . . . ,  XeMs) --  a e ( X e l s  . . . . .  Xejs . . . .  , XeMs) 
at~Xej 
is a first-order approximation to the marginal response of real output to the change in policy 
j in year t. 
If each input i had been allocated efficiently in year t, then the value of its marginal 
product would be equated across uses, implying that G e t F  e = ri, for some implicit factor 
price ri. In general, however, the value of the marginal product of factors could differ 
across finns. In the estimation, we will attempt to capture both systematic and nonsystem- 
afic variation across firms in these marginal products. In particular, we let 
a e t F  e = w i q - s  Z~iPk i -1- rlei, ( 3 )  
k 
where Z~ describes the kth dimension along which the marginal product of the ith factor 
may differ across firms, and where by construction ~ei is uncorrelated with these Zf, i. Sys- 
tematic variation in marginal products, for example, could arise due to heterogeneity in 
a factor, e.g., the marginal product of a worker varies depending on the education of the 
worker. If factors were allocated efficiently, the marginal product of a homogeneous factor 
should not differ systematically across firms, and the variance of ~ei should be zero. 
We can also use this approach to test whether factors were reallocated systematically 
between year s and year t toward finns where their marginal products were higher. To test 
whether firms receiving relatively larger factor allocations had higher marginal products 
for these factors, we simply set Zfi = (Atsgei /Qes) .  If its coefficient, Pli, is greater than 
zero, then the reallocation of this factor between year s and year t raised efficiency. 
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In order to end up with a specification capable of being estimated using the available 
data, we assume that each regulatory change leads to the same percent change in output 
in all affected firms, implying that @e/Ges does not vary with e. Denote this common value 
by Bj. In addition, in order to compensate for presumed heteroskedasticity, we divide equa- 
tion (2) through by real output in year s to get 
/Xt~Qe _ Get - + AtsXei. aes ~i f e l  AtsKei-~ ~ Gje-~ 9 O~ J ~j ~Ges j  (2a) 
Finally, denote the combined effects of regulatory changes and changes in factor inputs 
not included explicitly in the final specification by re. Given these assumptions, equations 
(2a) and (3) together imply that 
Atsae _ Z I (-Atsgei-~ -+-ZPkiZ~i (Atsgei-~ ~j 
Oes i ~ aes .j ki ~---~es J + ~j AtsXej + ~e' (4) 
where 
~ Ats Kei -~ 
6e =~i rlei(._ aes .J + Pe" 
We estimate equation (4) using ordinary least squares, and use the White (1980) procedure 
to construct heteroskedastic consistent estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients. 
Ordinary least squares estimation of equation (4) yields unbiased coefficient estimates if 
and only if Ee is uncorrelated with any of the variables on the right-hand side of the equa- 
tion. A variety of correlations are in principle possible. For example, the firms that are 
deregulated more quickly are not chosen randomly. Similarly, even though factors are allo- 
cated primarily by higher authorities, the resulting allocations may still depend on the ob- 
served performance of the firm. In each case, the government would most likely base these 
decisions on the level of accounting profits of the firm in previous years. The residual in 
equation (4), in contrast, measures unobserved effects causing changes in economic profits, 
where economic profits are measured based on implicit market prices rather than account- 
ing prices for factors. There is no reason to expect much correlation between the level 
of past profits and the change in profits during the sample period. Also the substantial 
differences between accounting and economic profits would greatly attenuate any relation- 
ship. As a result, we expect that any biases in our estimates are minor. But in interpreting 
the coefficients the possibility of such biases must be recognized. 7 
Coefficient estimates from equation (4) do not immediately give us a measure of produc- 
tivity growth between year s and year t, however. Overall productivity growth depends 
not only on the pattern of the regulatory changes, AtsXej , but also on the productivity of 
new vs. existing factor allocations. To provide a convenient summary measure of the size 
of overall productivity change, we therefore report the change in total factor productivity 
by industry, and for the aggregate sample. 
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Following Kendrick (1973), aggregate total factor productivity in year s, denoted by 
H,, equals 
~e Qes 
I I  s - ~ r iK i  s , (5) 
where real output, Qes is measured in the prices of some base year t, where Kis = ~ ege i s ,  
and where r i measures the value of the marginal product of factor i in year t. An analogous 
productivity measure, IIns, can be defined for each industry n in a given year, where 
~ e~n Qes 
Ilns -- ~i,eenriKeis. (5a) 
Given the presumed inefficiencies in the allocation of factors, there is a question about 
the appropriate definition of the ri 's.  We chose to measure each of the r i by the average 
marginal product of new factor allocations between year s and year t, as calculated using 
the estimates generated by equation (4). This implies that 
(~'ekPki Z~i Ats gei) Fi = Wi "1- Atsg i (6) 
The aggregate productivity change between years s and t is measured by H t - H~. It 
is straightforward to show that this expression equals 
Atsgi ~eQes -~ II t - l - ls-=I  ~eAtsQe Z(---~-is I ( rigis 
~eaes i ~frfKfs l t I ~iriKit ) 
(7) 
The term in brackets is simply the difference between the percent increase in the value 
of output and a weighted average of the percent increases in each of the inputs, weighted 
by their relative costs, with the weights summing to one. If the rate of increase in output 
exceeds that for inputs, then productivity has increased. 
Aggregate productivity change can also be expressed as 
IIt - I-Is = (~e Atsae -- IXs ~i riAtsgt~ / Z  (8) 
If II s equals one, then the numerator in this expression equals the change in the profits gen- 
erated by that enterprise between years s and t, measured using the appropriate values and 
costs. When II~ > 1, 8 then the value of output must increase proportionately more than the 
cost of inputs just to retain the initial level of productivity in the economy, and conversely. 
3. Empirical Implementation 
In order to estimate the coefficients in equation (4) or calculate any of the productivity 
measures, we need to construct values for each of the variables using the available data. 
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Table 1. Percent inflation rates by year, 
Year 
Percent Change In 1983-1984 1984-1985 1985-1986 1986-1987 
Output Price 1.64 3.97 4.68 3,80 
Capital Price 12.69 15.02 7.38 15.21 
Equipment Price 15.77 18.34 4.29 24.78 
Structure Price 9.89 11.60 10.39 6.60 
Materials Price 4.25 7.33 7.75 6.68 
Retail Price a 2.8 8.8 6.0 7.3 
aThe retail price inflation rate comes from State Statistical Bureau (1989), p. 24. 
In particular, we need values for real outputs, Qes, and real inputs, Kis. We consider three 
inputs: labor, capital, and materials/fuel/power. Finally, we discuss summary measures of 
the economic reform policies that may have affected productivity. Each variable is discussed 
in turn. 
3.1. R e a l  Output ,  Oes 
We need values for real output for each firm in each year, measured in the prices prevail- 
ing in some base year t. We use the last year of the survey as the base year, on the assump- 
tion that these relative prices are closer to relative market prices than are the prices in 
earlier years? In order to capture the effects of price changes during the sample period, 
we construct a separate measure of the inflation rate in output prices for each firm in each 
year, denoted by 7res, then use these inflation estimates to convert nominal output in earlier 
years to nominal output in 1987 prices. Using a separate inflation correction for each firm 
is important, given the variation across firms as well as over time in the fraction of trade 
taking place at official vs. market prices. 
Estimates of the inflation rate faced by each firm are constructed from responses to a 
question each year in which the firm was asked the effect of output price changes during 
the previous year on that year's sales revenue. The response should equal [(Pes - Pe,s- l ) /  
Pes]Ses, where Ses denotes the firm's nominal output in year s. Dividing the response by 
Ses gives % s  -- (Pe~ -- Pe,s-1)/Pes 9 It is easily shown that the inflation rate 7r~s, defined 
to equal ( P e s  - -  Pe,s-1)/Pe,s-1, can be estimated by ~es/(1 - aes)" 
We used this procedure to calculate a separate inflation correction for each firm in each 
year, as long as the firm reported the needed data. 1~ If  not, 7res was set equal to the 
weighted average value of the 7re~ in that year for firms with adequate data, weighting by 
sales revenue. 
In Table 1, we report the weighted average inflation rates in each year. Here, we find 
that the measured inflation rate in ex-factory prices is much smaller than the inflation rate 
in retail prices, which was 6.2 % per year on average between 1983-1987. This probably 
arises in part due to the tighter controls on the prices of industrial outputs, and in part 
due to firms choosing to sell at official prices, in order to avoid tax payments on any sup- 
plementary payments received in kind. 
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In Table 2, we report the overall inflation between 1983 and 1987 by industry in column 
1. The highest inflation rate is in building materials, which should not be surprising given 
the substantial building boom during the period, as well as the tightening of building stan- 
dards that were gradually adopted in response to the Tangshan earthquake. 
In selecting data for nominal output, we chose to use data on nominal sales rather than 
nominal production, xl By doing so, we assign a value to output only if a customer can be 
found so that the output does produce social value, and do not include output simply added 
to stockpiles. If and when the stockpiled output is sold, then it would be included in meas- 
ured output. One problem with this approach is that output sold to government procure- 
ment agencies, and then stockpiled, is included in measured output, whereas if the firm 
stockpiles the output it would not be included. Since sales to government procurement agen- 
cies were more important at the beginning of the sample period, this will bias downwards 
our measure of output growth for firms producing some unwanted goods. 
We report the aggregate annual percent growth in real output in Table 3, and the overall 
percent growth between 1983 and 1987 by industry in Table 4, using the above definition 
of real output. Table 3 shows a steady growth in real output, reaching a double digit growth 
Table 2. Annual percent inflation rates between 1983-1987 by industry. 
Industry Output Price Materials Price 
Mining 4.53 2.92 
Utility 2.76 10.94 
Food and Fodder 3.19 1.90 
Beverage and Tobacco 1.66 10.39 
Textile 2.67 3.56 
Other Light 5.86 10.11 
Chemical 4.27 8.07 
Building Materials 9.60 14.10 
Metallurgy 2.87 8.44 
Machinery 3.69 6.70 
Electric Equipment 1.94 4.84 
Sample Average 3.91 7.37 
Table 3. Percent growth rates by year. 
Year 
Growth Of 1983-1984 1984-i985 1985-1986 1986-1987 
Real Output 5.71 7.42 11.72 10.07 
Real Capital 7.53 9.12 13.58 23.50 
Real Materials - 0 . 1 5  7.53 12.66 - 2 . 3 2  
Labor 4.83 - .71 a 1.47 2.01 
With College or Post-College Ed. 7.95 10.57 a 8.60 12.61 
With Senior Secondary Ed. 7.17 6.30 a 6.49 6.44 
With Junior Secondary Ed. or Less .80 .44 a - . 6 0  - . 9 6  
aDiscrepancy in the growth rates of labor input was caused by missing observations in disaggregated labor inputs. 
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Table 4. Annual percent growth between 1983-1987 by industry. 
Industry Output Labor Capital Materials 
Mining 4.75 3.32 8.60 3.96 
Utility 1.32 2.17 4.53 2.94 
Food and Fodder -.73 1.16 11.97 1.30 
Beverage and Tobacco 12.47 4.62 21.36 9.96 
Textile 5.99 1.92 11.87 3.33 
Other Light 5.12 .25 14.98 1.52 
Chemical 5.10 4.15 11.18 3.82 
Building Materials 3.71 1.44 7.79 -2.30 
Metallurgy 9.87 .99 13.23 .86 
Machinery 11.00 1.45 8.48 9.05 
Electric Equipment 18.59 2.65 11.27 19.76 
Sample Average 8.70 2.05 11.58 4.27 
rate during the last two years of our sample period. Output growth rates differed dramatically 
by industry, however, with real sales of the electronics industry virtually doubling between 
1983 and 1987, and sales of food and fodder declining slightly in real terms. 
3.2. Labor Input, Kels 
We measure the labor input for a firm in year s simply by the average number of workers 
at the firm over the course of the year, as reported in the survey. We did not make use of 
data on time loss due to work stoppages (due, for example, to shortages of raw materials), 
on the grounds that the opportunity cost of labor is measured by the potential work hours, 
not the actual work hours. Our procedure therefore captures efficiency gains arising from 
decreased stoppages. Table 3 reports the annual percent growth in the aggregate number 
of workers, while Table 4 reports the annual percent growth by industry in the number 
of workers between 1983 and 1987. Except during 1983-1984, the aggregate labor supply 
has been virtually constant in these firms. Even at the industry level, only in the utilities 
industry and the food and fodder industry was the growth rate in labor supply greater than 
the growth rate in output. Relative to other industries, the greatest growth in labor supply 
was in chemicals and in the beverage and tobacco industry. 
To test for possible heterogeneity of labor, we allow the marginal product of labor to 
differ by level of education. In particular, we consider three different levels of education 
(8 years or less, 9 to 12 years, and more than 12 years). The percent growth rates of each 
of these categories of workers is listed by year in Table 3. As seen in the table, the quality 
of the labor force increased quickly during the period: the number of workers with some 
college education increased by 46% between 1983 and 1987, while the number with at 
most 8 years of education declined slightly. 12 
3.3. Material, Fuel, and Power Inputs, Kez s 
Real material inputs in each year are calculated based on the same approach used to calculate 
real output. In particular, the survey reports in each year the change in material, fuel, and 
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power expenses from the previous year due to price changes. These figures are used as 
above to construct an inflation rate for materials for each firm. ~3 
Table 1 reports the weighted average inflation rate for materials in each year, while Table 
2 reports the overall inflation between 1983 and 1987, by industry. In aggregate, the price 
of materials went up at almost twice the rate of output prices. The building-materials indus- 
try faced the greatest increases in prices for its material inputs, consistent with their having 
the greatest increase in output prices. The utilities industry had the second largest increase 
in material input prices, however, even though their output prices changed by less than 
the average for the sample as a whole. 
It is interesting to compare the growth rate in the price of materials with the growth 
rate of the output prices in those industries that produce material inputs. For example, while 
the prices of material/fuel/power inputs went up by 33 % during the period, the output prices 
from the chemicals, electronic, metallurgy, mining, and utilities industries, all of which 
in part produce material inputs for other industries, each went up by at most 19 %. How 
can the prices paid by firms for inputs they buy increase more quickly than the prices received 
by firms for inputs they sell? One explanation for this discrepancy, suggested to us in inter- 
views with finn managers, is that firms selling materials may sometimes report only the 
cash component of the sale, while firms buying the materials report the total cost. TM The 
gap between the cash cost and the total cost of materials undoubtedly grew quickly during 
this period since official prices did not keep up with the underlying inflation rate. 
In measuring nominal material inputs, we use data on purchases rather than data on the 
value of materials used in production. 15 It is the purchase of materials, rather than their use, 
that makes them unavailable to the rest of the economy. Under this approach, extra output 
produced using materials withdrawn from inventory is taken to be an efficiency gain. If, 
without the reforms, these materials would have remained in inventory indefinitely, as seems 
likely given the incentives firms faced under the prior regime to hoard inputs, then with- 
drawal from inventories does indeed produce an efficiency gain. If newly purchased inputs 
added to inventory will be used at a later date, then the true production process has a dy- 
namic element which for simplicity we ignore. 
Nominal material inputs were reexpressed in 1987 prices, using the estimated inflation 
rates, to get real material inputs. Our measure of the relative amounts of material inputs 
used by different firms is in error to the degree to which different firms received different 
relative discounts from market prices for these inputs in 1987, or at least reported different 
relative discounts under expenditures for materials. For example, the price of inputs allocated 
through the plan would normally be very low, and planned allocations differ by firm. 16 
The annual percent change in real material inputs is reported in Table 3, while the over- 
all percent change in real material inputs from 1983 to 1987 is reported in Table 4, by 
industry. In most industries, the percent increase in real material purchases during the period 
was much smaller than the percent increase in real sales. 
3.4. Capital Input, Ke3s 
Measuring real capital inputs presents a variety of extra complications. First, the informa- 
tion about inflation in capital costs is much more scanty. The only direct information available 
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in the survey comes from responses to a set of questions about capital costs asked of each 
manager. If  the firm had continued to buy a similar type of machinery over a period of 
years, the manager was asked what the prices were at the earliest and the latest dates at 
which this type of machinery was purchased. In particular, firm e reports purchases in 
year s and year s '  at prices Os and Os, respectively. 
We used the set of answers to these questions provided by all the firms in the sample 
to estimate the aggregate inflation rate for capital prices, Zrs ~, in each year s. In particular, 
if the inflation rates, 7r~, are the same for all firms, then Os,/O s s' K = exp(r~,.=~+l ~rr ), imply- 
ing that log(0s,/0s) = ~s'=~+l ~,.. Let R(e)  = log(0s,/0s), and let Dr(e ) = 1 if s < r _< s '  
for firm e and let Dr(e) = 0 otherwise. We then regressed the vector R on all the Dr's. 17 
The coefficient on Dr should equal the inflation rate in capital prices between year r - 1 
and year r. 
Unfortunately, the amount of information available was not sufficient to estimate all these 
coefficients reliably. We therefore imposed the constraint that the inflation rate follow a 
piecewise-linear pattern across time between 1974 and 1984, with change in slope in years 
1979, 1981, and 1984.18 In addition, given other evidence of stable prices prior to the re- 
forms, ~9 we imposed the further constraint that the inflation rate was zero until after 1979. 2~ 
The resulting coefficient estimates for the time path of the inflation rate are reported in 
Table 5. Overall, these estimates seem very reasonable. Inflation was low in the early 1980s, 
but hit double digits in 1984-1985, dropped in 1986 as credit tightened, then jumped again 
thereafter as controls relaxed. 
These estimates are much higher than the inflation rates in output prices for industries 
producing machinery and equipment, reported in Table 2, a result analogous to that found 
for materials. Part of the explanation here may be that some of the data used in the regres- 
sion refer to prices of imported machinery? 1 whereas the data in Table 2 are solely for 
domestically produced machinery. Another possibility, as before, is that firms selling 
machinery understate their revenue by reporting only the cash component of the sale, whereas 
managers report in the survey the total cost of the machinery purchased. We chose to use 
the regression results for the inflation rate for machinery, rather than data from Table 2, 
Table 5. Equipment price inflation regression. 
Time Estimated Standard 
Dummies Coefficients Error 
D80 -.0265 .0347 
D81 -.0529 .0694 
D82 .0173 .0274 
D83 .0848 .0467 
D84 .1577 .0954 
D85 .1834 .1230 
D86 .0429 .1214 
D87 .2478 .1014 
D88 .1577 .0795 
Consmnt .1133 .1044 
R 2 .2175 
Observations 142 
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under the assumption that the accounting data also report the total cost, rather than the 
cash cost, of machinery and equipment purchased. 
The regression estimates the inflation rate only for machinery prices. Our only informa- 
tion about the inflation rate for the cost of structures comes from the data on output prices 
for firms producing building materials. To calculate an overall inflation rate in a given 
year for productive investment for each firm, we took a weighted average of these inflation 
rates for machinery and structures, weighting the inflation rate for machinery by the amount 
spent by the firm on equipment as a fraction of total productive investment. The aggregate 
yearly inflation rate for productive investment is reported in Table 1. Capital input prices 
grew more quickly than either material prices or output prices. 
To measure the change in real capital inputs between one year and the next, we first 
converted nominal investment in productive assets in each year into real investment in 1987 
prices using the annual inflation rates, as calculated above. Denote the real investment in 
year s by I s. We assumed that capital investment occurs at a smooth rate during the year, 
implying that on average investment taking place in s is available for use during only half 
of year s. Given this assumption, new investment leads to a gross increase in the available 
capital between years s - 1 and year s of .5(Is_ 1 + Is). This is the procedure we use to 
measure the change in capital inputs when estimating equation (4). 
To calculate the growth rates in capital inputs and the various productivity measures, 
we also needed to estimate the capital stock in each year for each firm. We started with 
the firm's reported figure for year-end fixed productive assets in 1983, valued at purchase 
prices. By subtracting productive investment in 1983, we have an estimate of the beginning- 
of-year capital stock, valued at purchase prices, z2 We then converted this estimate of the 
beginning-of-year capital stock in 1983 to 1987 prices using the estimated inflation rates 
for productive investment between 1983 and 1987. To get the average amount of real capital 
in 1983, we then added back half of the real investment that occurred during 1983. The 
average amount of real capital in each later year is then derived by adding on our estimate 
of the change in real capital for that firm, as calculated above. 
There may be two sources of error in these figures. First, the data on year-end fixed 
productive assets in 1983 do not include prior investment in projects still under construc- 
tion. To measure the opportunity cost of the resources committed to the firm, past expen- 
ditures on uncompleted projects should be included. In addition, the above procedure does 
not take into account any sales by the firm of capital assets during the sample period, or 
any capital that is scrapped. Unfortunately, the available data does not allow us to correct 
for these problems. The first problem leads to an underestimate of the capital stock, while 
the second leads to an overestimate. 
These figures also ignore depreciation. By doing so, we assume that the productivity 
of each piece of capital remains unchanged over time, as would be implied by a one-hoss- 
shay-technology, and that maintenance costs do not vary with age. Certainly, casual evidence 
suggests that the effective lifetime of capital is much longer in China than in the U.S. The 
arbitrary nature of the depreciation figures reported in the survey gave us no satisfactory 
alternative. 23 In addition, we ignore technological change. If more productive technologies 
are priced accordingly, then our approach should be satisfactory. 
As with materials, we are not able to take into account differing discounts from market 
prices received by firms when purchasing new capital. Fortunately, government subsidies 
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to capital purchases normally take the form of direct grants to cover the purchase of the 
capital or available bank loans at low interest rates (often with repayments deductible from 
taxable income), rather than reduced purchase prices for new capital. Barter trade may 
still create problems, however. 
Table 3 reports the annual growth rate in the aggregate real capital stock, while Table 4 
reports the overall growth rate in the capital stock between 1983 and 1987, by industry. 
The aggregate percent increase in real capital inputs was somewhat higher than the percent 
increase in output, particularly in 1986-1987, though this was not always true industry 
by industry--in both the machinery and the electronic industries, output grew more quickly. 
3.5. Regulatory Policies, Xejs 
Initially, in estimating equation (4) we include just a constant term to capture the overall 
percent increase in output not explained by increases in factor inputs. This captures ade- 
quately broad policy changes affecting the bulk of the firms in the sample, such as the 
broad shift to explicit taxes by 1984 and the shift to contracts in 1986-1987. It ignores, 
however, policy changes affecting only subsets of the firms. 
We therefore estimate a second version of equation (4) in which we include variables 
capturing the impact of a few specific policies on productivity growth. To begin with, firms 
acquired at different times the flexibility to make various economic decisions without gov- 
ernment approval. In the survey, each firm's manager reports the year in which his firm 
acquired the right to make each of six operational decisions. These decisions were: 1) out- 
put price, 2) output quantity, 3) composition of goods produced, 4) technology used in 
production, 5) timing of the production process, and 6) amount to be exported. 
Generally, the right to make the first five decisions was received simultaneously, whereas 
the right to control exports was more unusual and granted much later? 4 We calculated the 
average of the reported years in which each of the first five rights were received. If this 
average date were prior to 1983, then we set AtsXel to one, and set it to zero otherwise. 
This variable therefore captures the differing productivity growth of those firms that had 
already acquired the right to make decisions by the beginning of our sample period. For 
those firms that acquired the right during the sample period, we set ,SrsXe2 equal to the 
number of years during the sample in which they had this flexibility. The longer the firm 
had this flexibility, the larger the presumed effect. 
The timing of the effects of this type of decentralization can be complicated. If, in response 
to the new flexibility, firms choose to shift the type of goods they produce, or the technology 
they use, then output may fall initially as the retooling takes place. Also, the decentraliza- 
tion of decisions would likely be accompanied by a loss of the right to sell all output to 
a state purchasing agency, leading to an initial drop in sales until customers can be located. 
When firms know ahead the date of this decentralization, they may even start to retool 
ahead of time. Given the limited amount of data we had, however, we did not attempt to 
capture any nonlinearities in the effects of this variable. 
Firms also differed in the fraction of profits they could retain. The larger this fraction, 
presumably the larger the incentive to improve efficiency. 25 We therefore defined ~t~Xe3 
to equal the average ratio of retained profit to realized profit during 1983-1987. 
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Finally, we added dummy variables to capture the effects of recent policy experiments. 
In particular, we set AtsXe4 to one if the firm was under the contracting system as of the 
date of the interview, and set it to zero otherwise. Similarly, AtsXe5 was set equal to one 
if the firm was participating in the assets management responsibility system, and AtsXe6 
was set equal to one if the firm was participating in the factory manager responsibility system. 
4. Results 
4.1. Estimation of Equation (4) 
We estimated three versions of equation (4). The dependent variable was the fraction by 
which that firm's real output grew from 1983 to 1987. For each input, we included as an 
independent variable the change in the real amount of that input available to the firm be- 
tween 1983 and 1987, divided by that firm's real output in 1983. The set of Z~ and AtsXej 
variables included varied by specification. We chose to focus on the overall change during 
the reform period, rather than on the year-by-year changes, in order to reduce any biases 
arising from our neglect of the potentially complicated timing of the impact of additional 
inputs on output, z7 and from the short panel we have. 
The base sample of firms used included alt firms with adequate data for that regression. 
After deleting firms with missing data or extreme outliers, z8 we had a sample of 285 firms 
for the first regression, out of an original sample of 403, 281 firms for the second regres- 
sion, and 280 firms for the third regression. Regression results appear in Tables 6 and 7. 
In the first specification, in addition to the variables measuring changes in factor input, 
we set Z1 e = (Atsgei/Qes), leading us to include the square of this varaible for each of the 
factors. A constant term is included to capture the effects of the regulatory changes. In 
the results, reported in column 1 of Table 6, we find from the constant term that in aggre- 
gate firms experienced a 16.7 % increase in output during the period beyond what can be 
explained by increased inputs. (The standard error of this estimate is very small.) As seen 
in equation (8), this estimate of the constant term is proportional to the change in overall 
productivity growth if the initial value of II in 1983 were equal to one. 29 We return later 
to examine productivity growth figures in more detail. 
By including the ZI~/terms, we allowed the marginal products of each factor to vary by 
firm, as a function of the actual change in inputs, to test whether there was any systematic 
tendency to allocate more inputs to more efficient firms. If more efficient firms did get 
more inputs, then the coefficient of the squared value of the change in each input, as a 
fraction of initial output, should be positive. We find that this coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant only for materials--it is small and insignificant for labor and capi- 
tal. 3~ These findings are not surprising. Markets were set up for material inputs during 
this period, so in spite of the continuing allocation of some materials through the plan, 
market forces could still shift materials significantly toward firms where their marginal 
product was higher. But labor and capital used in the state sector during this period con- 
tinued to be allocated primarily by higher authorities. 
Our estimate for the marginal product of materials varies from 1.07 in the electronics 
industry to .99 in the building materials industry; 3~ the weighted average value of the 
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Table 6. Productivity regressions--versions I and II, 
II 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error 
zkL 
- -  2.3065 1.3167 2.0322 1.3131 
O 
~ @ ~ 2  -1 .3678  4.2025 -7 .7695 4.2202 
zXK 
- -  .0827 .0761 .0812 .0779 Q 
( )QK~2 .0219 .0157 .0240 .0159 
AM 
--Q- .9919 .0871 1.0238 .0897 
I - ~ - ~  2 .1139 .0477 .0998 .0483 
Decentralized Before 1983 - -  - -  - . 0584  ,0715 
Years of Decentralization - -  - -  .0158 .0198 
Retention Rate - -  - -  - .  1361 ,1401 
D (Responsibility) - -  - -  .0141 ~0860 
D (Asset Responsibility) - -  - -  .1728 ,1179 
D (Manager Responsibility) - -  - -  .0589 .0867 
Constant .1674 .0355 .1595 .0889 
R 2 .7376 .7529 
Observations 286 282 
Table 7. Productivity regression--version III. 
III 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Standard Error 
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marginal product for each input, estimated using equation (6), equals 1.01. This is remark- 
able since efficient resource allocation argues that materials should be used until the value 
of their marginal product equals their cost. Since we have measured material inputs based 
on their cost, efficient resource allocation implies that their marginal product should equal 
1.0, which is just what we find. How can this be reconciled with persistent complaints 
of material shortages leading to production stoppages? For one thing, this is an estimate 
of the value of the marginal product of materials as a group. The marginal product of elec- 
tricity may be much higher, and that of other material inputs may be much lower. In addi- 
tion, firms may report true input prices but underreport true output prices, leading us to 
underestimate the true value of the marginal product of materials. 
Our coefficients imply that the weighted average real return to capital equals 9.3 % per- 
year, before depreciation. While the standard error of this estimate is almost as large, this 
estimate still implies that the return to capital is very low by international standards. This 
may in part reflect the sizable amount of new investment going into uncompleted projects, 
as well as the expenditures on company cars and other perquisites that do not raise observed 
output. These estimates are certainly consistent with the view that the government has un- 
duly favored investment over consumption, leading to substantial overinvestment. However, 
the coefficients may also simply reflect lags in the impact of new investment on output 
not taken into account in the specification. Finally, we may underestimate the value of the 
marginal product of capital because firms underreport the value of their output compared 
with the costs of their inputs. 
Finally, our estimate of the value of the marginal product of labor is 2303 yuan per year. 
In contrast, the average wage per worker in the sample, including bonuses, was only 1806 
yuan per year in 1987. However, the nonproductive capital, primarily housing, allocated 
to these workers had an opportunity cost of 576 yuan per year, implying a total implicit 
income of these workers of 2382 yuan per year. 3z Together, these figures imply an implicit 
3.2% wage subsidy? 3 
Our estimates of the marginal products of each factor seem remarkably close to the actual 
pay received by each factor. This is just what should occur under a competitive market 
system. In spite of the lack of explicit factor markets, one possible conclusion is that alloca- 
tions approximate what would occur with such markets. There may be a very different 
explanation, however. Official prices in China are normally set equal to a mark-up over 
average costs. If the mark-up rate is 7, then by construction Qes = 'Y~ ' i r i sK i s ,  where ris 
is now interpreted to equal the accounting cost of input i used in setting prices in period 
s. As a result, 
AtsQe ='Y~i ritAtsKi- ~Qes -'Y~i ritK@ 9 (lO) 
Here, the term in parentheses measures the profits that would have been earned in period 
s if prices had been set at their values in period t. In period t, at these prices, the firm 
broke even by construction. If there had been productivity growth between periods s and 
t, this term would be negative, implying a positive constant term in equation (10). Therefore, 
if the data were determined by equation (10), so that reported sales revenue is entirely 
based on official prices, then our estimates of the r i should simply equal the accounting 
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costs for each input used in setting prices in period t, times % This seems to be a plausible 
explanation for our results. 
In the second specification we tried in addition to estimate the effects of specific policy 
changes. These attempts proved to be less successful--the standard errors of these estimates 
were large enough that even coefficients implying important effects on productivity would 
not be statistically significantly different from zero. In any case, the only coefficient large 
enough to imply an economically important impact on productivity is the dummy variable 
for those firms under the asset management responsibility system. According to our esti- 
mates, these firms experienced an additional 17 % increase in productivity beyond that found 
for other firms. Given that this experiment occurred late in the sample interval, this change 
is very large, though the standard error of the estimate is also quite large. 
In the final specification, we allowed the marginal product of labor to vary by education. 
This was done by adding appropriately defined dummy variables as Z// variables, and drop- 
ping the Xej and the squared changes in input terms, given their lack of importance in the 
specification. Here, we find that the estimated marginal product of labor varied substan- 
tially with education? 4 Controlling for the change in the quality of the labor force also 
caused the constant term to fall in half, suggesting that about half of the overall productivity 
growth was due to the improvement in the quality of the labor force. 
Our finding that measured policy changes had statistically insignificant impact on pro- 
ductivity does not necessarily mean that the reforms had negligible impact. The reforms 
undertaken in China affected most state enterprises at roughly the same time. As a result, 
we find that there was too little variation in the timing or the form of the reforms affecting 
different firms to allow their effect to be estimated using our approach. Most of the impact 
of the policy changes is therefore simply captured by the intercept term in the regression. 
Controlling for changes in the composition of the labor force, our estimates suggest a pro- 
ductivity growth of 2.05 % per year between 1983-1987 that can potentially be attributed 
to the reforms. While our estimation approach has not proven capable of linking specific 
reforms to the observed productivity growth, a closer examination of the timing of the pro- 
ductivity growth during the period, and a study of the detailed behavior of firms in response 
to the reforms, may still potentially provide evidence of the role that the reforms played 
in the observed productivity growth. 
4.2. Productivity Measures 
These regression estimates allow us to calculate the opportunity cost of each of the inputs, 
r i. Using the procedure described by equation (6), we set the opportunity cost of labor 
equal to 2303 yuan per year. Similarly, the opportunity rate of return on capital was set 
equal to 9.3 %, while the opportunity cost of materials was set equal to 1.01 per yuan of 
materials. 
Given these estimates, we then calculated the values of the productivity measure for each 
industry for both 1983 and 1987. These are reported in Table 8 for the sample of 274 firms 
for which all needed data were available. Here, we find that in 1983, the aggregate produc- 
tivity measure equals 1.07, implying that in aggregate revenues and economic costs were 
very close in 1983. 
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Table 8. Productivity by industry. 
ProductNity 
Industry 1983 1987 Percent Change 
Mining 1.31 1.33 1.44 
Utility .70 .65 - 8.13 
Food and Fodder 1.07 .96 -10.34 
Beverage and Tobacco 1.98 2.15 8.89 
Textile .91 1.00 9.50 
Other Light .88 .98 10.61 
Chemical 1.08 1.11 2.76 
Building Materials 1.02 1.17 14.16 
Metallurgy .92 1.36 48.70 
Machinery .95 1.11 16.88 
Electric Equipment 1.07 1.11 3.56 
Sample Average 1.07 1.28 19.96 
The value of the productivity measure in 1983 varies to some degree by industry, however. 
In particular, its value ranges from 1.98 in the beverage and tobacco industry to 0.70 in 
the utilities industry. In each of these two cases, differences from the aggregate value prob- 
ably can be explained by systematic deviations in the observed prices in 1987 from social 
values. In particular, the first industry is largely alcohol and tobacco, where prices are 
kept artificially high to discourage use. The social value of the output of this industry would 
plausibly be much lower than the market value. Similarly, the price of electricity has been 
kept artificially low, implying that the measured value of the output of the utilities industry 
undoubtedly understates its social value. THe values of the productivity measure for most 
of the other industries are tightly bunched around the economy-wide value. 
By 1987, the aggregate value of the productivity measure had increased from 1.07 to 
1.28, implying productivity growth of over 4.6% per year between 1983 and 1987, for 
an aggregate growth of 20 %. Since real output of these firms grew by 8.7 % per year dur- 
ing this period, we estimate that over half of the total growth results from a growth in 
productivity. 
While aggregate productivity grew by 20% during this period, however, most industries 
experienced much smaller productivity growth. Metallurgy experienced a dramatic 48.7 % 
increase in productivity, and there was a sizable improvement in both building materials 
and other light industries, but productivity increased by less than 10% in other industries 
and even fell in the utilities and food and fodder industries. Since 37.6% of the aggregate 
social cost of inputs were allocated to the metallurgy industry between 1983 to 1987, the 
productivity growth in this section has a major influence on the aggregate figures. 
The overall increase in productivity also appears to result in part from a shift in resources 
away from industries with low productivity and toward industries with high productivity. 
The aggregate social costs of real inputs grew by 37.3 %, but it grew by 57.3 % in beverages 
and tobacco (the most productive industry) and grew by only 26.4% in the utilities industry 
(the least productive industry).35 
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5. Conclusions 
What  happened to the productivity of Chinese state enterprises between 1983 and 1987? 
Based on the estimates we have obtained from a sample of  285 firms, we find that produc- 
tivity increased by 4.6 % per  year during this period. About half  of this productivity growth 
appears due to the rapidly improving educational level of  the labor force in these firms. 
Since real output grew by 8.7 % during the same period,  over half  of the growth in output 
appears to have arisen from growth in productivity. 
At this point, we have been unsuccessful in pinpointing what specifically led to this pro- 
ductivity growth. Many policies changed during this period,  but we found that there was 
too little variation in the timing or the form of these policy changes among our sample 
of  firms to estimate adequately the impact of  specific policies. There was limited evidence, 
however, that the asset management responsibility system raised productivity significantly. 
We also estimated the value of  the marginal products of labor, capital and materials dur- 
ing this period. The estimated value of the marginal product of materials just  equaled its 
costs, suggesting an efficient supply of  materials. The value of the marginal product of  
labor was estimated to be 2303 yuan per  year, while the actual average pay per  worker, 
plus housing benefits, in 1987 was 2382 per  year, implying a very low implicit  subsidy 
to labor. Finally, capital was estimated to earn a real rate of  return of 9.3 % per year before 
depreciation, which is very low by international standards. 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank two anonymous referees and participants in a conference at Shen- 
zhen, sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
for comments,  and to thank the Ford Foundation for financial support for the project.  
No~s 
1. Under the responsibility system, farmers could sell at market prices whatever production they had left over, 
after delivering their quota production to the government at planned prices. 
2. However, more profitable firms do not necessarily have more profitable new projects. 
3. Further information about this data set can be obtained from the authors on request. 
4. This literature dates back to Solow (1957) and Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (1961). For applications 
to market economies, see Gollop and Jorgenson (1980), Gordon, Schankerman and Spady (1986), and Griliches 
and Mairesse (1984) among many others. For applications to China, see Chert, Wang, Zheng, Jefferson, 
and Rawski (1988), Dollar (1990), Jefferson (1989) and Lee (1990) among others. 
5. Our finite-difference approach is similar to that in Griliches and Mairesse (1983). Griliches and Mairesse 
estimated the marginal return to R&D by assuming that the marginal return is identical across firms rather 
than assuming that the output elasticity of R&D is identical across firms. In their estimation, however, the 
production function was still assumed to be Cobb-Douglas in labor input and capital input. 
6. To the degree to which the true value of Ue is correlated with the included right-hand-side variables, coeffi- 
cients have to be interpreted accordingly. 
7. We saw no plausible instruments for the government's choices for either the firm's factor inputs or the firm's 
regulatory regime. 
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8. While the value of II s would equal one if the economy were perfectly competitive and all firms had constant 
returns to scale, in general its value will differ from one. 
9. Even if relative prices in 1987 were closer to relative market prices than were prices in earlier years, impor- 
tant differences still remain. The extent of market trade differs by industry, leading to an undervaluation of 
the output of more tightly controlled industries. In addition, output is often sold for a combination of goods 
and money, yet the financial accounts appear to include just the cash component of sales. The value of output 
that is exported is also likely to be measured poorly, since any difference between the foreign and the domestic 
price normally went to a Foreign Trade Company rather than the manufacturer. Productivity is therefore 
judged based on these reported prices rather than based on the prices faced by the ultimate user of the output. 
10. Sufficient data were available to calculate 7res for 254 firms in 1987, 250 firms in 1986, 245 firms in 1985, 
and 168 firms in 1984. 
11. The firm was dropped from the analysis if nominal sales was missing in either 1983 or 1987. 
12. Recall that education virtually stopped in China during the period 1967-1976 because of the Cultural Revo- 
lution-colleges in particular reopened only in 1978. As a result, the observed rapid increase in the number 
of educated workers is not surprising. 
13. Sufficient data were available to calculate the inflation rate for 304 firms in 1987, 284 firms in 1986, 269 
firms in 1985, and 190 firms in 1984. If sufficient data were missing, the inflation rate was set equal to 
the weighted average value across firms with adequate data, weighting by expenditures on materials. 
14. Due to barter trade, only part of the payment for materials may be in cash. Supplementary noncash payments 
may show up in the accounts, but under nonbusiness expenditures rather than material expenditures. Similarly, 
the revenue from the resale of materials would likely show up as nonhusiness income. Since these categories 
include a variety of items, we cannot observe supplementary payments or resales, so cannot undo these meas- 
urement problems. 
15. Specifically, we set nominal material inputs equal to nominal purchases of materials, fuel, and power, plus 
the value of materials provided by customers for processing. The firm was dropped from the analysis if this 
figure was unavailable in either 1983 or 1987. 
16. Firms that are allocated more materials at planned prices also normally must sell more of their output at 
planned prices. Therefore, the bias from the understatement of inputs due to the continuing role of the plan 
should offset the understatement of output due to the plan. 
17. A firm was included if year s were no earlier than 1974 and no later than 1987, and if both price figures 
were available. In total, data were available for 142 firms. 
18. The value of the F statistic for these constraints was .536, with a critical value of 6,88, so that these con- 
straints were easily accepted. 
19. See, for example, Jefferson et al. (1988). 
20. The F statistic for this constraint was 0.47, with a critical value of 9.02, easily accepting this additional constraint. 
21. Firms may not be charged the world-market cost of imported machinery, however, or at least may not report 
the opportunity cost based on market exchange rates. 
22. Given the low inflation rate in capital costs prior to 1983, as seen in Table 5, there should be relatively little 
error from measuring values at purchase prices rather than replacement costs. 
23. Our estimation also confirms this evidence. In a slightly altered specification, we estimate the implicit deprecia- 
tion rate/~ by specifying the increase in real capital stock between year s and year t in equation (4) by 
~ , , g e  = le  - -  e K e s  
where I e measures new investment between years s and t, and Kes is the gross real capital stock in year s. 
The estimated t5 is .00034 or .034% with a standard error .019. This result strongly suggests that the implicit 
depreciation rate in Chinese state enterprises is negligible. 
24. During our sample period, most state enterprises did not have direct access to international markets. Foreign 
trade in China was monopolized by the Foreign Trade Companies, which procured exportable goods at domestic 
prices from state enterprises and kept any profits generated when these goods were sold to foreigners. Only 
in 1988 did China begin to decentralize foreign trade and allow exporters to directly market their products 
overseas. Given that our sample ended in 1987, we therefore did not make use of this measure of enterprise 
autonomy in our study. 
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25. The average amount of profits retained could well differ from the amount retained from an extra dollar of 
pretax profits. We felt, however, that the finn's forecast of its average tax payments in the future would be 
determined in large part by its past average tax payments rather than by the statutory construction of its mar- 
ginal tax rate. 
26. A detailed description of each of these experiments can be found in Lee (1990). 
27. For example, additional workers need to be trained, implying an initial drop in output after they are hired, 
as other workers spend time on this training. Only after this training is complete does output grow in response 
to the added work force. 
28. We eliminated five firms that had values for the dependent variables, or for one of the three independent 
variables measuring the change in real input divided by 1983 output, that exceeded ten. 
29. The calculated value of II, reported below, is in fact 1.07. 
30. This is certainly consistent with marginal products of labor and capital having been equalized, as would occur 
under efficient resource allocation, though it would be premature to conclude this, given that we have ex- 
plored only one dimension along which marginal products might vary. 
31. The variation across firms, however, is much larger; the marginal product of materials ranges from 0.9 to 
1.6 across enterprises included in the regression. 
32. In addition, workers receive health insurance, pensions, and other nonwage benefits from the firm, but these 
expenditures are more difficult to extract from the accounts. 
33. Workers are still subject to turnover tax payments, however. 
34. Wages, in constrast, were tightly controlled by the government in China and varied little with education. 
According to Knight and Song (1991), for example, college graduates earned only 2% more than high school 
graduates in 1986, and only 3% more than middle school graduates. 
35. To the extent that the social value of the output of these industries is mismeasured, this source of productivity 
growth may be artificial. 
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